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Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association
08-1448
Ruling Below: Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3573 (2010).
Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law an Act that imposes civil penalty of up to $1,000 on
any person that sold or rented a violent video game to a minor. The Act also requires violent
video games to be labeled as such. Before the Act took effect, various video game associations
filed suit against the Governor and the State for declaratory relief against the Act on the grounds
that it unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression on its face based on content regulation
and the labeling requirement, was unconstitutionally vague, and violated equal protection. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the video game associations and the State of
California appealed. The State urged the appellate court to extend the “obscenity as to minors”
standard first mentioned in Ginsberg v. New York, which permitted a state to prohibit the sale of
sexually explicit material to minors that it could not ban from distribution to adults, to include
materials containing violence. The appellate court, however, declined to extend Ginsberg and
held that the Act is a presumptively invalid content-based restriction on speech and strict scrutiny
remained the applicable review standard. Additionally, the court found that the evidence
presented by the State did not support the purported interest in preventing psychological or
neurological harm to minors. None of the research established or suggested a causal link between
minors playing violent video games and actual psychological or neurological harm, and
inferences to that effect would not be reasonable. As a result, the State had not met its burden to
demonstrate a compelling interest. Because the Act was invalid and, as a result, there was no
state-mandated age threshold for the purchase or rental of video games, the State’s mandated
label would arguably convey a false statement that certain conduct was illegal when it was not.
Questions Presented: (1) Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of
violent video games to minors? (2) If the First Amendment applies to violent video games that
are sold to minors, and the standard of review is strict scrutiny, under Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994), is the state required to demonstrate a direct
causal link between violent video games and physical and psychological harm to minors before
the state can prohibit the sale of the games to minors?
VIDEO SOFTWARE DEALERS ASSOCIATION; Entertainment Software Association,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, in his official capacity as Governor State of California;
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General, State of California,
Defendants-Appellants, and George Kennedy, in his official capacity as Santa Clara
County District Attorney; Richard Doyle, in his official capacity as City Attorney for the
City of San Jose; Ann Miller Ravel, in her official capacity as County Counsel for the
County of Santa Clara, Defendants.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed February 20, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-Appellants California Governor
Schwarzenegger and California Attorney
General Brown (the “State”) appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Video
Software
Dealers
Association
and
Entertainment
Software
Association
(“Plaintiffs”), and the denial of the State’s
cross-motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory relief
seeking to invalidate newly enacted
California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5
(the “Act”), which impose restrictions and a
labeling requirement on the sale or rental of
“violent video games” to minors, on the
grounds that the Act violates rights
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
We hold that the Act, as a presumptively
invalid content-based restriction on speech,
is subject to strict scrutiny and not the
“variable obscenity” standard from Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Applying
strict scrutiny, we hold that the Act violates
rights protected by the First Amendment
because the State has not demonstrated a
compelling interest, has not tailored the
restriction to its alleged compelling interest,
and there exist less-restrictive means that
would further the State’s expressed interests.
Additionally, we hold that the Act’s labeling
requirement is unconstitutionally compelled
speech under the First Amendment because
it does not require the disclosure of purely
factual information; but compels the
carrying of the State’s controversial opinion.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs and
its denial of the State’s cross-motion.
Because we affirm the district court on these
grounds, we do not reach two of Plaintiffs’
challenges to the Act: first, that the language
of the Act is unconstitutionally vague, and,
second, that the Act violates Plaintiffs’
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
A.
On
October
7,
2005,
Governor
Schwarzenegger signed into law Assembly
Bill 1179 (“AB 1179”), codified at Civil
Code §§ 1746-1746.5. The Act states that
“[a] person may not sell or rent a video
game that has been labeled as a violent
video game to a minor.” Violators are
subject to a civil penalty of up to $ 1,000.
***
The Act also imposes a labeling
requirement. It requires that each “violent
video game” imported into or distributed in
California must “be labeled with a solid
white ‘18’ outlined in black,” which shall
appear on the front face of the game’s
package and be “no less than 2 inches by 2
inches” in size.
A.B. 1179 states that the State of California
has two compelling interests that support the
Act: (1) “preventing violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior”; and (2) “preventing
psychological or neurological harm to
minors who play violent video games.” A.B.
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1179 also “finds and declares” that:
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of
violence in video games, including
sexual and heinous violence, makes
those minors more likely to
experience feelings of aggression, to
experience a reduction of activity in
the frontal lobes of the brain, and to
exhibit
violent
antisocial
or
aggressive behavior.
(b) Even minors who do not commit
acts of violence suffer psychological
harm from prolonged exposure to
violent video games.

Software Rating Board (“ESRB”), an
independent, self-regulated body established
by the Entertainment Software Association,
rates the content of video games that are
voluntarily submitted. ESRB assigns each
game one of six age-specific ratings, ranging
from “Early Childhood” to “Adults Only.” It
also assigns to each game one of roughly
thirty content descriptors, which include
“Animated Blood,” “Blood and Gore,”
“Cartoon Violence,” “Crude Humor,”
“Fantasy Violence,” “Intense Violence,”
“Language,” “Suggestive Themes,” and
“Sexual Violence.”
C.

The State included in the excerpts of record
several hundred pages of material on which
the Legislature purportedly relied in passing
the Act. While many of the materials are
social science studies on the asserted impact
of violent video games on children, other
documents are varied and include legal
analyses, general background papers,
position papers, etc. Dr. Craig Anderson,
whose work is central to the State’s
arguments in this case, is listed as an author
of roughly half of the works included in the
bibliography.

On October 17, 2005, before the Act took
effect, Plaintiffs filed suit against the
Governor, the Attorney General, and three
city and county defendants, all in their
official capacities, for declaratory relief
against the Act on the grounds that it
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs argued
that the Act unconstitutionally restricted
freedom of expression on its face based on
content regulation and the labeling
requirement, was unconstitutionally vague,
and violated equal protection.

B.

The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction. Video Software
Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F.
Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The district court
granted Plaintiffs’ motion and denied the
State’s cross-motion. The district court’s
summary judgment order invalidated the Act
under strict scrutiny, and did not reach
Plaintiffs’ claims regarding vagueness, equal
protection,
or
the
Act’s
labeling
requirement. The district court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Act. The State

The content of the video games potentially
affected by the Act is diverse. Some of the
games to which the Act might apply are
unquestionably violent by everyday
standards, digitally depicting what most
people would agree amounts to murder,
torture, or mutilation. . . .
The video game industry has in place a
voluntary rating system to provide
consumers and retailers information about
video game content. The Entertainment
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timely appealed.
II.
***
III.
[The Court concludes that the entire Act is
not invalidated even though the State
concedes on appeal that the alternate
definition of a “violent video game” in
section 1746(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutionally
broad. The remaining provisions can be
severed.]
IV.
Our next task is to determine what level of
scrutiny to apply in reviewing the Act’s
prohibitions. . . .
The Supreme Court has stated that “minors
are entitled to a significant measure of First
Amendment protection, and only in
relatively
narrow
and
well-defined
circumstances may government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to
them.” The State does not contest that video
games are a form of expression protected by
the First Amendment. It is also undisputed
that the Act seeks to restrict expression in
video games based on its content.
“Content-based
regulations
are
presumptively invalid.” We ordinarily
review content-based restrictions on
protected expression under strict scrutiny,
and thus, to survive, the Act “must be
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
Government interest.” “If a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s
purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.”
The State, however, urges us to depart from

this framework because the Act concerns
minors. It argues that we should analyze the
Act’s restrictions under what has been called
the “variable obscenity” or “obscenity as to
minors” standard first mentioned in
Ginsberg [v. New York]. In essence, the
State argues that the Court’s reasoning in
Ginsberg that a state could prohibit the sale
of sexually-explicit material to minors that it
could not ban from distribution to adults
should be extended to materials containing
violence. This presents an invitation to reconsider the boundaries of the legal concept
of “obscenity” under the First Amendment.
In Ginsberg, the Court held that New York
State could prohibit the sale of sexuallyexplicit material to minors that was defined
by statute as obscene because of its appeal to
minors. Therefore, the state could prohibit
the sale of “girlie magazines” to minors
regardless of the fact that the material was
not considered obscene for adults. The Court
stated that “[t]o sustain the power to exclude
material defined as obscenity by [the statute]
requires only that we be able to say that it
was not irrational for the legislature to find
that exposure to material condemned by the
statute is harmful to minors.” The Court
offered two justifications for applying this
rational
basis
standard:
(1)
that
“constitutional
interpretation
has
consistently recognized that the parents’
claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in
the structure of our society”; and (2) the
state’s “independent interest in the
wellbeing of its youth.”
The State suggests that the justifications
underlying Ginsberg should apply to the
regulation of violent content as well as
sexually explicit material. The assertion,
however, fails when we consider the
category of material to which the Ginsberg
decision applies and the First Amendment
5

principles in which that decision was rooted.
Ginsberg is specifically rooted in the
Court’s First Amendment obscenity
jurisprudence, which relates to nonprotected sex-based expression—not violent
content, which is presumably protected by
the First Amendment. Ginsberg explicitly
states that the New York statute under
review “simply adjusts the definition of
obscenity to social realities by permitting the
appeal of this type of material to be assessed
in term of the sexual interests of such
minors.” The definition of obscenity that
Ginsberg adjusted was the Court’s obscenity
test announced in Roth v. United States,
which dealt with obscene materials defined
with reference to sex. The Ginsberg Court
applied a rational basis test to the statute at
issue because it placed the magazines at
issue within a sub-category of obscenity—
obscenity as to minors—that had been
determined to be not protected by the First
Amendment, and it did not create an entirely
new category of expression excepted from
First Amendment protection. The State, in
essence, asks us to create a new category of
non-protected material based on its
depiction of violence.

American Amusement Machine Association
v. Kendrick, which involved a video game
restriction that mixed the regulation of
sexual and violent material, the Seventh
Circuit discussed why “[v]iolence and
obscenity are distinct categories of
objectionable depiction,” explaining that
obscenity is concerned with “offensiveness,”
whereas ordinances like the one at issue in
Kendrick (and here) are concerned with
conduct or harm. In Video Software Dealers
Association v. Webster, the Eighth Circuit
held that videos “that contain[ ] violence but
not depictions or descriptions of sexual
conduct cannot be obscene.” Likewise, in
Eclipse Enterprises, Inc. v. Gulotta, the
Second Circuit declined to place trading
cards which depicted heinous crime that was
allegedly harmful to minors in the category
of unprotected obscenity. Further, in James
v. Meow Media, Inc., the Sixth Circuit, in
discussing excessively violent movies and
video game material, “decline[d] to extend
[its] obscenity jurisprudence to violent,
instead of sexually explicit, material.”
Finally, we note that the Ginsberg Court
suggested its intent to place a substantive
limit on its holding. It stated:

The Supreme Court has carefully limited
obscenity to sexual content. Although the
Court has wrestled with the precise
formulation of the legal test by which it
classifies obscene material, it has
consistently addressed obscenity with
reference to sex-based material. Such was
the case in Roth and Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, which modified Roth. And
though it post-dates Ginsberg, the Court in
Miller v. California expressly cabined the
First Amendment concept of obscenity in
terms of sexual material.

We have no occasion in this case to
consider the impact of the guarantees
of freedom of expression upon the
totality of the relationship of the
minor and the State. It is enough for
the purposes of this case that we
inquire
whether
it
was
constitutionally impermissible for
New York . . . to accord minors
under 17 a more restricted right than
that assured to adults to judge and
determine for themselves what sex
material they may read or see.

Circuit courts have resisted attempts to
broaden obscenity to cover violent material
as well as sexually-explicit material. In

Though not the clearest of disclaimers, this
language telegraphs that the Court’s concern
in Ginsberg was with the relationship
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between the state and minors with respect to
a certain subject matter—“sex material” as it
relates to the interests of minors.
In light of our reading of Ginsberg and the
cases from our sister circuits, we decline the
State’s invitation to apply the Ginsberg
rationale to materials depicting violence, and
hold that strict scrutiny remains the
applicable review standard. Our decision is
consistent with the decisions of several other
courts that have addressed and rejected the
argument that the Ginsberg standard be
extended from the field of sex-based content
to violence in video games. At oral
argument, the State confirmed that it is
asking us to boldly go where no court has
gone before. We decline the State’s entreaty
to extend the reach of Ginsberg and thereby
redefine the concept of obscenity under the
First Amendment.
V.
Accordingly, we review the Act’s contentbased prohibitions under strict scrutiny. As
noted above, “[c]ontent-based regulations
are presumptively invalid,” and to survive
the Act “must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest.
Further, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative
would serve the Government’s purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative.”
A.
. . . The State’s focus is on the actual harm
to the brain of the child playing the video
game. Therefore, we will not assess the
Legislature’s purported interest in the
prevention of “violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior.”
The Supreme Court has recognized that
“there is a compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well-being of
minors.” Notwithstanding this abstract

compelling interest, when the government
seeks to restrict speech “[i]t must
demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way.” Although we
must accord deference to the predictive
judgments of the legislature, our “obligation
is to assure that, in formulating its
judgments, [the legislature] has drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence.”
In evaluating the State’s asserted interests,
we must distinguish the State’s interest in
protecting minors from actual psychological
or neurological harm from the State’s
interest in controlling minors’ thoughts. The
latter is not legitimate. . . .
In Kendrick, the Seventh Circuit commented
on a psychological harm rationale in the
violent video game context:
Violence has always been and
remains a central interest of
humankind and a recurrent, even
obsessive theme of culture both high
and low. It engages the interest of
children from an early age, as
anyone familiar with the classic fairy
tales collected by Grimm, Andersen,
and Perrault is aware. To shield
children right up to the age of 18
from exposure to violent descriptions
and images would not only be
quixotic, but deforming; it would
leave them unequipped to cope with
the world as we know it.
Because the government may not restrict
speech in order to control a minor’s
thoughts, we focus on the State’s
psychological harm rationale in terms of
some actual effect on minors’ psychological
health.
7

Whether the State’s interest in preventing
psychological or neurological harm to
minors is legally compelling depends on the
evidence the State proffers of the effect of
video games on minors. Although the
Legislature is entitled to some deference, the
courts are required to review whether the
Legislature has drawn reasonable inferences
from the evidence presented. Here, the State
relies on a number of studies in support of
its argument that there is substantial
evidence of a causal effect between minors
playing violent video games and actual
psychological harm.
The State relies heavily on the work of Dr.
Craig Anderson, pointing to Dr. Anderson’s
2004 updated meta-analysis called An
update on the effects of playing violent video
games. This article states that it “reveals that
exposure to violent video games is
significantly linked to increases in
aggressive behaviour, aggressive cognition,
aggressive affect, and cardiovascular
arousal, and to decreases in helping
behaviour.” Even upon lay review, however,
the disclaimers in this article, alone,
significantly undermine the inferences
drawn by the State in support of its
psychological harm rationale. First, Dr.
Anderson remarks on the relative paucity of
the video game literature and concedes that
the violent video game literature is not
sufficiently large to conduct a detailed metaanalysis of the specific methodological
features of other studies, many of which
were themselves flawed. Second, he further
states that “[t]here is not a large enough
body of samples . . . for truly sensitive tests
of potential age difference in susceptibility
to violent video game effects,” and jettisons
mid-article his exploration of the effect of
age differences (i.e., over-eighteen versus
under-eighteen). It appears that he
abandoned the age aspect of the study, in
part, because “there was a hint that the
aggressive behaviour results might be

slightly larger for the 18 and over group.”
He concludes the meta-analysis with the
admission that there is a “glaring empirical
gap” in video game violence research due to
“the lack of longitudinal studies.”
Thus, Dr. Anderson’s research has readily
admitted flaws that undermine its support of
the State’s interest in regulating video games
sales and rentals to minors, perhaps most
importantly its retreat from the study of the
psychological effects of video games as
related to the age of the person studied.
Although not dispositive of this case, we
note that other courts have either rejected
Dr. Anderson’s research or found it
insufficient to establish a causal link
between violence in video games and
psychological harm.
The State also relies on a study of the effects
of video game violence on adolescents,
conducted by Dr. Douglas Gentile, which
studied eighth and ninth graders and
concluded that “[a]dolescents who expose
themselves to greater amounts of video
game violence were more hostile” and
reported getting into more arguments and
fights and performing poorly in school. The
extent to which this study supports the
State’s position is suspect for similar reasons
as Dr. Anderson’s work. First, this study
states that due to its “correlational nature” it
could not directly answer the following
question: “Are young adolescents more
hostile and aggressive because they expose
themselves to media violence, or do
previously hostile adolescents prefer violent
media?” Second, this study largely relates to
the player’s violent or aggressive behavior
toward others—which, as noted above, is
not the interest relied on by the State here—
rather than the psychological or neurological
harm to the player. Moreover, the study
glaringly states that “[i]t is important to note
. . . that this study is limited by its
correlational nature. Inferences about causal
8

direction should be viewed with caution.”
Finally, Dr. Gentile’s study suggests that
“[a]dditional experimental and longitudinal
research is needed.”
Additionally, the State relies on a study by
Dr. Jeanne Funk for the proposition that
video games can lead to desensitization to
violence in minors. Like the others, this
study presents only an attenuated path
between video game violence and
desensitization. It specifically disclaims that
it is based on correlation principles and that
“causality was not studied.”
Finally, the State relies on a two-page press
release from Indiana University regarding
the purported connection between violent
video games and altered brain activity in the
frontal lobe. The research described,
conducted in part by Dr. Kronenberger, has
been criticized by courts that have reviewed
it in depth.
In sum, the evidence presented by the State
does not support the Legislature’s purported
interest in preventing psychological or
neurological harm. Nearly all of the research
is based on correlation, not evidence of
causation, and most of the studies suffer
from significant, admitted flaws in
methodology as they relate to the State’s
claimed interest. None of the research
establishes or suggests a causal link between
minors playing violent video games and
actual psychological or neurological harm,
and inferences to that effect would not be
reasonable. In fact, some of the studies
caution
against
inferring
causation.
Although we do not require the State to
demonstrate a “scientific certainty,” the
State must come forward with more than it
has. As a result, the State has not met its
burden to demonstrate a compelling interest.

Even if

B.
we assume

that

the State

demonstrated a compelling interest in
preventing psychological or neurological
harm, the State still has the burden of
demonstrating that the Act is narrowly
tailored to further that interest, and that there
are no less restrictive alternatives that would
further the Act. We hold that the State has
not demonstrated that less restrictive
alternative means are not available.
Instead of focusing its argument on the
possibility of less restrictive means, the
State obscures the analysis by focusing on
the “most effective” means, which it asserts
is the one thousand dollar penalty imposed
for each violation. Specifically, the State
argues that the ESRB rating system, a
voluntary system without the force of law or
civil penalty, is not a less-restrictive
alternative means of furthering the
Legislature’s purported compelling interest.
Acknowledging that the industry has
implemented new enforcement mechanisms,
the State nevertheless argues that the ESRB
does not adequately prevent minors from
purchasing M-rated games. The State also
dismisses the notion that parental controls
on modern gaming systems could serve the
government’s purposes, arguing that there is
no evidence that this technology existed at
the time the Act was passed.
Further, the State does not acknowledge the
possibility that an enhanced education
campaign about the ESRB rating system
directed at retailers and parents would help
achieve government interests. The State
appears to be singularly focused on the
“most effective” way to further its goal,
instead of the “least restrictive means,” and
has not shown why the less-restrictive
means would be ineffective.
Even assuming that the State’s interests in
enacting the Act are sufficient, the State has
not demonstrated why less restrictive means
would not forward its interests. The Act,
9

therefore, is not narrowly tailored. Based on
the foregoing, and in light of the
presumptive invalidity of content-based
restrictions, we conclude that the Act fails
under strict scrutiny review.
VI.
Finally, we evaluate the constitutionality of
the Act’s labeling provision, which requires
that the front side of the package of a
“violent video game” be labeled with a four
square inch label that reads “18.” Plaintiffs
argue that section 1746.2 unconstitutionally
forces video game retailers to carry the State
of California’s subjective opinion, a
message with which it disagrees. The State
counters that the “labeling provision impacts
the purely commercial aspect regarding
retail sales of the covered video games” and,
under the resulting rational basis analysis,
the labeling requirement is rationally related
to the State’s “self-evident purpose of
communicating to consumers and store
clerks that the video game cannot be legally
purchased by anyone under 18 years of age.”
Generally, “freedom of speech prohibits the
government from telling people what they
must say.” Commercial speech, however, is
generally accorded less protection than other
expression. The Court has upheld compelled
commercial speech where the state required
inclusion
of
“purely
factual
and
uncontroversial information” in advertising.
Compelled disclosures, justified by the need
to “dissipate the possibility of consumer
confusion or deception,” are permissible if
the “disclosure requirements are reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of customers.

analysis would direct what level of scrutiny
to apply to the labeling requirement.
However, we need not decide that question
because the labeling requirement fails even
under the factual information and deception
prevention standards set forth in Zauderer.
Our holding above, that the Act’s sale and
rental prohibition is unconstitutional,
negates the State’s argument that the
labeling provision only requires that video
game retailers carry “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” in advertising.
Unless the Act can clearly and legally
characterize a video game as “violent” and
not subject to First Amendment protections,
the “18” sticker does not convey factual
information.
Moreover, the labeling requirement fails
Zauderer’s rational relationship test, which
asks if the “disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of customers.” Our
determination
that
the
Act
is
unconstitutional eliminates the alleged
deception that the State’s labeling
requirement would purportedly prevent: the
misleading of consumers and retailers by the
ESRB age ratings that already appear on the
video games’ packaging. Since the Act is
invalid and, as a result, there is no statemandated age threshold for the purchase or
rental of video games, there is no chance for
deception based on the possibly conflicting
ESRB rating labels. In fact, the State’s
mandated label would arguably now convey
a false statement that certain conduct is
illegal when it is not, and the State has no
legitimate reason to force retailers to affix
false information on their products.
VII.

Ordinarily, we would initially decide
whether video game packaging constitutes
separable commercial speech or commercial
speech that is “inextricably intertwined”
with otherwise fully-protected speech. That

We decline the State’s invitation to apply
the variable obscenity standard from
Ginsberg to the Act because we do not read
Ginsberg as reaching beyond the context of
10

restrictions on sexually-explicit materials or
as creating an entirely new category of
expression—speech as to minors—excepted
from First Amendment protections. As the
Act is a content based regulation, it is
subject to strict scrutiny and is
presumptively invalid. Under strict scrutiny,
the State has not produced substantial
evidence that supports the Legislature’s
conclusion that violent video games cause
psychological or neurological harm to
minors. Even if it did, the Act is not
narrowly tailored to prevent that harm and
there remain less-restrictive means of

forwarding the State’s purported interests,
such as the improved ESRB rating system,
enhanced educational campaigns, and
parental controls. Finally, even if the Act’s
labeling
requirement
affects
only
commercial speech in the form of video
game packaging, that provision constitutes
impermissibly compelled speech because the
compelled label would not convey purely
factual information. Accordingly, the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to
Plaintiffs and denial of the State’s crossmotion for summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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“High Court Takes Video Game Case”
USA Today
April 29, 2010
Joan Biskupic
Taking up a new First Amendment test of
disturbing images, the Supreme Court
agreed Monday to hear California’s appeal
of a decision that struck down a state law
prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors.
The justices’ decision to accept the case,
which will be heard in the term that begins
next fall, comes a week after the justices
threw out a federal law that swept too
broadly in banning depictions of animal
cruelty. The court by an 8-1 vote rejected
arguments by the federal government that it
could carve out a new exception to the First
Amendment—as exists for obscenity—for
images of animal cruelty, such as
dogfighting.
In the new dispute, Schwarzenegger v.
Video Software Dealers Association,
California officials urge the justices to create
an exemption for a class of violent videos
that appeals “to the deviant or morbid
interest and has no socially redeeming value
for minors.”
Led by Attorney General Jerry Brown, state
officials say studies point to “growing
evidence that these games harm minors.”
Paul Smith, a lawyer who represents
associations of companies that create and
sell videos, disputed the danger of the games
and termed them “a modern form of artistic
expression. Like motion pictures and
television programs, video games tell stories
and entertain audiences.”
The 2005 law, challenged by the Video
Software
Dealers
Association
and

Entertainment Software Association, bars
the sale or rental of “violent” video games to
minors and calls for fines of up to $1,000.
The law defines a violent game as one that
depicts “killing, maiming, dismembering or
sexually assaulting an image of a human
being” in a way that appeals to a deviant
interest of minors and lacks “serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.”
As an example of a game the law might
cover, California officials cited one in which
“girls attacked with a shovel will beg for
mercy; the player can be merciless and
decapitate them.”
A federal appeals court ruled last year that
the California law was too broadly written
and that state lawyers had failed to justify
any First Amendment exception for video
games. The appeals court questioned the
connection to psychological harm to youths
and said, “Even if the state had a compelling
interest in preventing psychological or
neurological harm allegedly caused by
violent video games, the law was not
narrowly tailored to further that interest.”
In its appeal, California argues that
“excessively violent material is no more
worthy of First Amendment protection than
sexual material” when children are involved.
The state’s argument relies largely on a
1968 case, Ginsberg v. New York, that
upheld restrictions on the sale of sexual
material to minors.
Smith had countered that the obscenity
exception to the First Amendment has long
been confined to sexually explicit, not
12

violent, materials. Regarding video games
generally, Smith said, “Like great literature,
games often involve themes such as good vs.
evil, triumph over adversity, struggle against
corrupt powers and quest for adventure.

Amendment
Center
at
Vanderbilt
University, said the case “gives the court a
pristine opportunity to explain whether the
‘harmful to minors’ standard applies outside
of sex and into violence.”

David Hudson, a lawyer at the First
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“Supreme Court to Hear Videogames Case”
The Wall Street Journal
April 27, 2010
Brent Kendall
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to decide the constitutionality of a California
law that seeks to ban the sale of violent
videogames to minors.
Two lower courts struck down the law as an
unconstitutional restriction on freedom of
speech.
How the high court rules could affect
videogame makers such as Activision
Blizzard Inc., producer of “Call of Duty,”
and Take-Two Interactive Software Inc.’s
Rockstar Games, which makes “Grand Theft
Auto.” The case could also have
implications for the broader entertainment
industry, specifically for producers of
violent movies and television shows.
Last week the court took a broad view of the
First Amendment when it struck down a
federal law banning depictions of animal
cruelty. The court said the law was too
sweeping in restricting speech.
California argued in its petition to the
Supreme Court that lawmakers should be
able to ban sales of violent videogames to
those younger than 18 just as they can
restrict the sale of sexual material to minors.
The state said violent videogames are “a
new, modern threat to children” that cause
psychological harm and make minors more
likely to exhibit violent or aggressive
behavior.
Two trade associations challenged the law
before it went into effect, arguing that
videogames are a modern form of artistic
expression entitled to First Amendment

protection.
Michael D. Gallagher, president of the
Entertainment Software Association, which
represents U.S. computer-game and
videogame publishers, said the industry’s
voluntary rating system has successfully
informed consumers and parents about the
games’ content.
Entertainment lawyer Stephen Smith, of the
Greenberg Glusker law firm in Los Angeles,
said games rated as “mature,” such as “Call
of Duty” and “Grand Theft Auto,” are some
of the industry’s biggest sellers. He said the
loss of teen customers could make it hard for
companies to justify large budgets for
creating and marketing such games. But he
also said restricting sales wouldn’t be easy
because many games are purchased and
played online.
It isn’t clear which games would be affected
by California’s law, which defines a violent
video game as one that “includes killing,
maiming, dismembering or sexually
assaulting an image of a human being.”
In a statement, California Attorney General
Edmund G. Brown Jr. said: “It is time to
allow California’s common-sense law to go
into effect and help parents protect their
children from violent video games.”
The Supreme Court’s decision to consider
the case came as something of a surprise
because lower courts have been unanimous
in striking down laws similar to California’s.
A federal trial judge in San Jose and the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals each ruled
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that California didn’t have sufficient
evidence to support the claim that violent
videogames harmed minors. The courts also
said there were other, less restrictive ways to
prevent minors from playing the games,
such as parental controls on some gaming
systems.
The
case
is
Schwarzenegger
v.
Entertainment Merchants Assn., 08-1448.

Oral arguments will take place during the
court’s next term, which begins in October.
“This is an important issue with national
implications, particularly in light of the
growing evidence that these games harm
minors and that industry self-regulation
through the existing rating system has
proven ineffective,” the state said in its
petition.
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“Governor Schwarzenegger’s Video Game Act
Terminated by the Ninth Circuit”
JOLT Digest
February 28, 2009
Brittany Blueitt
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of the
United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, enjoining the
enforcement of an Act that imposed a
mandatory labeling requirement for all
“violent” video games and prohibited the
sale of such games to minors.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Act posed a
presumptively
invalid
content-based
restriction on speech in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The Ninth Circuit also held
that the Act’s labeling requirement
constituted unconstitutionally compelled
speech because it did not require disclosure
of purely factual information, but required
the carrying of the State’s opinion as to the
nature of the video game. In so holding, the
Court noted that “minors are entitled to a
significant measure of First Amendment
protection, and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government
bar public dissemination of protected
materials to them.”

California Civil Code §§ 1746-1746.5 (the
“Act”) restricts the sale of violent video
games to minors, and imposes a labeling
requirement on such games. Video Software
Dealers Association and Entertainment
Software Association filed for declaratory
relief seeking to invalidate the Act on the
grounds that it violated rights guaranteed
under the First Amendment. The District
Court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs.

The Wall Street Journal highlights that the
state, in defending the law, argued that
violence and sex should be governed by
analogous prohibitions: the government can
prohibit the sale of explicit pornography to
minors, and so it should also be able to limit
the sale of ultra-violent video games.

In upholding the District Court’s order and
striking down the Act, the Ninth Circuit
declined to “boldly go where no court has
gone before” by extending the “variable
obscenity” (“obscenity as to minors”)
standard set forth in Ginsberg v. New York
390 U.S. 629 (1968), which upheld the
prohibition of sale of sexually-explicit
material to minors that was defined by
statute as obscene because of its appeal to
minors. In doing so, the Court restricted
Ginsberg’s application to sex-based
expression, not expression containing only
violent content. After declining to expand
Ginsberg, the Court reviewed the Act in
accordance with the presumption of
invalidity
applied
to
content-based
restrictions, and finally determined that the
State’s asserted interest in “preventing
psychological or neurological harm to
minors” was insufficient to pass strict
scrutiny.

Ars Technica notes that should this case
reach the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that
the Court will discover anything that the
court of appeals failed to notice.

According to the Court, the government’s
interest is compelling only when “the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural and [ ]
the regulation will in fact alleviate these
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harms in a direct and material way.” The
Court found the research proffered by the
State to support its assertion of harm
insufficient because the research suggested
only
correlation
between
actual
psychological harm and violent video games
and not causation. Furthermore, the Court
found that even if there was a direct causal
relationship between the asserted harms and
violent video games, the State failed to
demonstrate that the Act was narrowly
tailored to achieve the State interest.

Ninth Circuit noted that although
commercial speech is accorded less
protection than other speech, the Court has
only upheld compelled commercial speech
where the State required inclusion of “purely
factual and uncontroversial information.”
The label required by the Act did not
provide factual information but rather
compelled
speech
concerning
the
government’s opinion about the content of
the video game. This type of compelled
speech is cannot pass constitutional scrutiny.

Turning to the question of labeling, the
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“Why Nine Court Defeats Haven't Stopped States
from Trying to Restrict ‘Violent’ Video Games”
The Free Expression Policy Project
August 15, 2007
Marjorie Heins
The August 6, 2007, decision by U.S.
District Judge Ronald Whyte striking down
California’s video game censorship law was
the ninth such ruling by a federal court in
the past six years. Yet state and local
legislators continue to press for laws
restricting minors’ access to games with
“violence,” “inappropriate violence,” “ultra
violence,” or whatever other term they hope
will ban the games they think harmful.
According
to
the
website
Game
Censorship.com, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas,
New York, North Carolina, and Utah are
currently considering legislation restricting
minors’ access to games with violent
content. The nine states or localities whose
laws have been struck down include (in
addition to California) Indianapolis, St.
Louis, Michigan, Washington, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Oklahoma.
Why do lawmakers continue to press for
censorship of video games despite the clear
unconstitutionality of the enterprise? The
answer probably lies in the long history of
media-violence politics, a history that goes
back more than a century, to an era when
concerns that crime and detective magazines
would corrupt urban youth first led to laws
banning stories of “bloodshed, lust, or
crime.” The concern resurfaced in the 1930s,
once movies captured the national
imagination, and again in the 1950s when
television became our dominant mass
medium, while crime-and-adventure comics
were accused of causing juvenile

delinquency. In the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, the
government liberally funded researchers
who sought to prove harmful effects from
gunslinger shows and other televised
violence, and politicians as well as the
researchers often misrepresented the dubious
results of their experiments.
Fast forward to 2000, when four
professional associations issued a “Joint
Statement” asserting that “well over 1000
studies . . . point overwhelmingly to a causal
connection between media violence and
aggressive behavior in some children.” The
Statement was so rife with errors that it was
difficult to understand how these groups—
which included the American Medical
Association (the AMA)—could have
endorsed it.
Dr. Edward Hill, chair-elect of the AMA,
shed some light on this question the
following year during a panel discussion.
Responding to questions about the Joint
Statement, Dr. Hill explained that it was the
AMA’s desire for health education funding
that drove its support of the Joint Statement.
The AMA is “sometimes used by the
politicians. We try to balance that because
we try to use them also, so it’s a contest. . . .
There were political reasons for signing on.
We’re looking for a champion in Congress
that will be willing to back our desire for
funding for comprehensive school health in
this country.”
By the late 1990s, violent video games were
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stirring new concerns. Their interactivity,
some critics said, increased the risk of
imitative behavior. Psychologist Craig
Anderson became a prominent spokesman
for this view; among his experimental
findings were that subjects who had played
violent games in a laboratory administered
slightly longer “noise blasts” than a control
group. They also recognized “aggressive
words” slightly more quickly. (The
difference was in fractions of a second.)
Anderson
posited
that
recognizing
aggressive words reflects aggressive
thoughts, and that aggressive thoughts lead
to aggressive behavior.
Anderson’s research may have been squishy,
but several states and localities relied on it
between 2000 and 2006 in passing laws to
restrict minors’ access to video games. St.
Louis’s ordinance, for example, criminalized
selling, renting, or otherwise making
available to minors any “graphically
violent” video game, or permitting free play
of such a game without the consent of a
parent or guardian. The St. Louis County
Council, before passing the law, heard
testimony from Anderson that playing
violent games for 10 to 15 minutes causes
“aggressive behavior” and “that children
have more aggressive thoughts and
frequently more aggressive behavior after
playing violent video games.”
A federal district court relied on these
statements in upholding the law, but the
Court of Appeals reversed, finding the
County’s conclusions to be “simply
unsupported in the record.” Anderson’s
“vague generality” about aggressive
thoughts and behavior, the judges said, “falls
far short of a showing that video games are
psychologically deleterious,” and other
testimony was equally “ambiguous,
inconclusive, or irrelevant.”
The judges in the St. Louis case cited a

decision from a sister court, striking down
Indianapolis’s ordinance. In that case, the
court observed that from Grimm’s fairy tales
to horror movies and epic poems, violent
themes have been part of children’s
literature; to shield them from the subject
“would not only be quixotic, but
deforming.” Neither Anderson’s “aggressive
word” and “noise blast” experiments nor any
other evidence before the court showed that
video games “have ever caused anyone to
commit a violent act,” or “have caused the
average level of violence to increase
anywhere.”
In the Illinois case, the judge was
particularly skeptical of expert witness
testimony from Anderson and another
psychologist, William Kronenberger. The
judge
noted
that
Anderson
had
acknowledged exaggerating the significance
of studies that simply show a correlation
between aggression and video game play
(rather than a causative relationship); that
the longer noise blasts his subjects gave
after playing violent games were “a matter
of milliseconds”; and that he had
manipulated the data and methodology in his
“meta-analyses.” More credible, the court
found, were the plaintiffs’ experts, who
testified that Anderson “not only had failed
to cite any peer-reviewed studies that had
shown a definitive causal link between
violent video game play and aggression, but
had also ignored research that reached
conflicting conclusions.” The judge was
equally unsparing in his dissection of Dr.
Kronenberger’s testimony that studies of
adolescent brain activity point to harm from
violent video games.
None of this means, of course, that some
violent media might not sometimes reinforce
violent attitudes in some people, or even,
occasionally, contribute to violent behavior.
A lack of proof in court is simply that—a
lack of proof. It doesn’t mean that the
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contrary has been proven. Certainly, there
are isolated instances of direct imitation, and
certainly, the sadistic or misogynistic ideas
found in some games are disturbing. As the
court decisions suggest, though, it’s
impossible to define what kind of violent
images are harmful (just as it’s impossible to
pinpoint or quantify violent entertainment’s
possibly positive effects in relieving tension
or processing aggressive feelings in a safe
way).
The California law was typical in its
(unsuccessful) attempt to craft a definition
of “violent video game” that wouldn’t be so
broad as to encompass the universe of
historical,
sports,
fantasy,
sci-fi,
action/adventure,
knights-in-armor,
simulated battlefield, or classic literature
games. The definition had two parts: it
banned distribution to minors of games that
either (1) enable players to inflict virtual
injury “in a manner which is especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved,” or that (2)
“appeal to a deviant or morbid interest of
minors,” are “patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the community as to
what is suitable for minors,” and “lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.”

That latter definition was borrowed from the
familiar three-part test that courts have used
to condemn sexual material that’s deemed
“obscene” or “harmful to minors.” But as
Judge Whyte explained, violent expression
is generally protected by the First
Amendment unless the government can
show a “compelling” reason for its
suppression; “obscene” sexual expression is
not. As for the alternative definition
(“heinous, cruel, or depraved”), he pointed
out that it “has no exception for material
with some redeeming value and is therefore
too broad. The definition could literally
apply to some classic literature if put in the
form of a video game.”
Despite the impossibility of drafting a video
game censorship law that wouldn’t be
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,
politics will likely continue to drive this
debate—at least until health professionals,
legislators, and other policymakers agree to
unite behind programs of media literacy
education and genuine violence reduction
rather than attacking entertainment and
expression.
Action-hero-turned-Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the defendant in
the California case, would be an ideal
candidate to lead such an initiative.
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“The Court as Mr. Fix-It?”
The New York Times
April 30, 2010
Linda Greenhouse
Prohibition ended 77 years ago, yet
Americans have still not kicked the habit of
trying to fix social problems by banning
things.
Half a century ago, the target was true-crime
novels and magazines, those filled with
“pictures or stories of criminal deeds of
bloodshed, lust, or crime,” in the words of a
New York statute that made it a crime to
print, sell or even to give away such matter.
Nineteen other states had similar laws. The
Supreme Court declared in 1948 that the
statutes violated the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech, prompting a
passionate dissent from Justice Felix
Frankfurter. The former Harvard Law
School professor complained that the
majority was thwarting the states’ effort “to
solve what is perhaps the most persistent,
intractable, elusive and demanding of all
problems in society—the problem of crime
and, more particularly, of its prevention.”

challenged in court has been declared
unconstitutional.
So it was baffling this week to find the
Supreme Court weighing in where it doesn’t
appear to be needed. The court typically
takes up only those questions that have
produced contradictory rulings in the lower
courts; a “conflict in the circuits” is the
primary marker of a case the justices deem
worthy of their attention. Yet the justices
have agreed to hear California’s appeal of a
ruling by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit that struck down a state
law imposing a fine of up to $1,000 for the
sale or rental of a “violent video game” to a
person under the age of 18. The 2005 statute
defines “violent video game” as one that
“appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of
minors;” offends community standards; and
lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.”

The notion that reading a novel or magazine
could turn a decent citizen into a criminal—
or that banning one could make the streets
safer—sounds preposterous today. So does
the more recent effort by Nassau County,
N.Y., to ban the sale to minors of trading
cards depicting notorious criminals, an
ordinance that the federal appeals court in
New York declared unconstitutional in
1997.

This definition mirrors the way the Supreme
Court defines obscenity, a category of
expression deemed to lack First Amendment
protection. But obscenity, as a legal
category, always has a sexual component.
California is asking the Supreme Court for a
new carve-out from the First Amendment,
for depictions of violence when made
available to minors. The state “is asking us
to boldly go where no court has ever gone
before,” the Ninth Circuit panel observed.

The latest threat to public safety and morals,
evidently, is the video game. Bans on the
sale or rental of violent video games to
minors are popping up all over the
country—eight states so far, along with
several local laws. Every one that has been

Maybe the Supreme Court accepted the
case, Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment
Merchants Association, simply in order to
kill the state’s stunningly broad theory in the
cradle. The Roberts court has been highly
protective of free speech (too much so,
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according to critics of the recent campaign
finance decision, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, which invalidated
limits on corporate political speech). And
just last week, in United States v. Stevens,
the court voted 8 to 1 on First Amendment
grounds to strike down a federal law that
criminalized “crush videos” and other
commercial depictions of animal cruelty.
Or maybe the justices want to spare other
courts the need to keep reviewing and
declaring unconstitutional an endless
assortment of violent-video bans. If so, they
could hardly do better than simply to adopt
the opinion that Judge Richard A. Posner of
the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit wrote in 2001, invalidating
an Indianapolis violent-video ordinance. It’s
hard to top the Odyssey or the Divine
Comedy for gruesome depictions of torture
and mayhem, Judge Posner said, adding that
shielding modern children from violent
imagery “would leave them unequipped to
cope with the world as we know it.”
Whatever its motive, the Supreme Court’s
intervention at this point seems so gratuitous
that I find it hard to shake the concern that
some justices may actually think that social
engineering of this sort may actually do
some good. If so, let’s hope that the historyminded conservatives check their history
before signing on to this latest fad.
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“A Closer Look at the Parallels between US v. Stevens
and EMA v. Schwarzenegger”
GamesLaw
April 21, 2010
Liz Surette
This article is to supplement [Game
Politics]’s coverage of US v. Stevens and its
implications for the game industry. I will
elaborate on why the Supreme Court refuses
to analogize depictions of the unlawful
killing, maiming, wounding, etc. of animals
to child pornography and why it probably
will not liken video game violence to it
either in the pending case EMA v.
Schwarzenegger. Also, the somewhat lessdiscussed basis for the Stevens decision:
overbreadth of the statute and why the EMA
law will also likely be found overbroad and
stricken.
1. Why the Court did not create a new
category of unprotected speech, and why
they probably will not do so in EMA
either.
For those not familiar, First Amendment
jurisprudence recognizes specific categories
of speech that are minimally protected or not
protected at all. If the speech restricted by
the government, most often by statute in
First Amendment cases, is outside of those
specific, narrowly drawn categories, the
court will apply the Strict Scrutiny test. In
order to pass Strict Scrutiny, a content-based
restriction on speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government
interest and use the least restrictive means to
do so—more on that later.
Here, the Government argues that even
without historical precedent, new categories
of unprotected speech can still be created if
a weighing of the “value of the speech
against its societal costs” falls more heavily
on the latter. Because of New York v. Ferber

(discussed below), the Government suggests
that such a balancing test can be used to
create new categories of unprotected speech
all of the time.
As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in the
8-1 majority opinion, to use this “balancing
test” that the government relies on would
put at risk of censorship a great amount, if
not the vast majority, of the ordinary speech
we make to each other every day because
much of we say in ordinary conversation has
little or no “religious, political, scientific,
educational, journalistic, historical, or
artistic” value. It is an alarming proposition
that the states, municipalities, and the
federal government could ban speech that
they found objectionable “simply on the
basis that some speech is not worth it.” He
goes on to acknowledge that while certain
categories of speech, such as child
pornography, have been described as having
such slight or nonexistent value as to be
outweighed by societal interests, those
descriptions are just . . . well, “descriptions”
and not the actual rationale behind the
holdings.
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court
carved out a relatively new category of
unprotected speech—child pornography. In
the Stevens opinion, the Court made it quite
clear that Ferber was very exceptional and
that states will not be successful in
analogizing just anything to it in order to
create new exceptions to First Amendment
protection. In Ferber, the state had a
compelling interest in protecting children
from abuse and the Court further found that
the market for child pornography is
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intrinsically related to actual child abuse.
While it could be argued that the market for
crush videos is intrinsically related to animal
cruelty, the Court in Stevens did not say that
preventing animal cruelty was a compelling
state interest. (More on that later, too.) I read
Stevens’ interpretation of Ferber to mean
that both a compelling state interest and an
intrinsic relation between the prohibited
conduct and the restricted speech (which
could also inform a narrow tailoring
analysis) are required at the very least to
create a new category. If we were to apply
that to the statute at issue in EMA, we may
have a compelling interest in protecting
children from psychological harm, but we
find no causal relationship between video
game violence and psychological harm to
children, let alone an intrinsic relation
between depictions of violence in games and
violence in reality. I wonder if the Court
would even go as far as I just did, given that
it considers Ferber to be very, very, unique.
The balancing test that has been adopted
was done so by the people in our social
contract with our government by virtue of
the First Amendment is as follows: the
benefits of restricting the government itself,
in this case its ability to regulate and restrict
speech, outweigh the costs. Though crush
videos are disgusting, and some video game
violence is outright gratuitous and excessive,
the government cannot simply decide that it
wants to prohibit certain types of speech
based on its own whims as to what it finds
valuable and what if finds harmful. That is
why the Court will probably not decide that
virtual depictions of “killing, maiming,
dismembering, or sexually assaulting an
image of a human being” are unprotected
speech in EMA v. Schwarzenegger.
2. Overbreadth—why the “safe harbor”
exception won’t save the EMA law.
Overbreadth is a common cause of the

downfall of statutes, particularly in the First
Amendment context. To put it plainly, a
statute will be adjudged overbroad, and
therefore invalid, if it just so happens to
sweep in speech that the government has no
right to restrict (even if the government did
not intend it to), as well as speech that it can.
The rationale behind invalidating a statute
for this reason is that a person will decline to
exercise their right to free speech for fear of
running afoul of the law—thereby resulting
in the dreaded chilling effect.
Many statutes of all kinds have “safe
harbor” provisions—exceptions that are
written in as an attempt to protect citizens
against unintended applications of the law.
For example, it is well settled (see Miller v.
California) that a law restricting obscenity
must have a safe harbor because we
acknowledge that oftentimes patently
offensive depictions of sex should be
permitted and are often necessary for
literary, artistic, educational, or scientific
purposes, even if the work they are
contained in appeals to the prurient interest
when taken as a whole. The safe harbor
protects such works if they exhibit serious
value, and so the local bookstore can sell
erotic literature without fear of prosecution
even if it cannot sell Hustler.
The law at issue in Stevens contains such a
clause, which the Government argues should
save it. Any depiction that has “serious
religious, political, scientific, educational,
journalistic, historical, or artistic value” is
immune from prohibition. However, the safe
harbor was not enough to alleviate the
statute’s overbreadth because the word
“serious” itself actually restricts the amount
of protection that the safe harbor would give
to speech that is outside of the crush videos,
animal
fighting
(except
Spanish
bullfighting), or other extreme depictions of
animal cruelty that the law was intended to
prohibit. In addition to the high standard that
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the word “serious” implies, there is the
problem that much speech that is usually
protected (by default, I might add) simply
does not have serious religious, political,
scientific,
educational,
journalistic,
historical, or artistic value. The Court uses
recreational hunting videos as an example of
how speech that should ordinarily be
protected would not fall under the safe
harbor because it is merely “recreational.”
Also, the Government failed to justify its
characterization of Spanish bullfighting
videos as having inherent value and
reconcile that with its notion that Japanese
dog-fighting videos (one of which was one
of the grounds for Stevens’ conviction) do
not. In short, no reading of the safe harbor
results in the government banning only the
speech that it has specifically intended to
and that is why it is overbroad and invalid.
We could easily apply these ideas to the safe
harbor clause in California’s law restricting
the sale of violent video games to minors.
The statute exempts from its definition of
“violent video game” (and therefore from
the prohibition of sale to minors) games that
do not “as a whole lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.” Again, we can see the burden that
the word “serious” imposes. All games have
artistic value, but whether that value is
“serious” could be debatable in some cases
depending on what any legislature’s
definition of “serious” is. Also, as above,
video games are without question
“recreational,” and the vast majority of
recreational speech is protected under the
First Amendment by default. Even if a game
does not have serious artistic value, it would
still be entitled to First Amendment
protection if it is not obscene (or if
depictions of graphic violence are not an
unprotected category of speech, following
our assumptions above). However, the safe
harbor would not protect such games from

restriction and therefore would not be
sufficient to preserve the statute’s validity.
3. Conclusion and an observation.
In case you skimmed or skipped the wall of
text (understandable), in sum, the statute at
issue in EMA v. Schwarzenegger is
analogous to the one in US v. Stevens and
will probably be stricken down because the
Court is loathe to create new categories of
unprotected speech except in very extreme
circumstances, and that the statute restricts
speech that is protected, even if it also
regulates speech that is unprotected.
I mentioned Strict Scrutiny way back up
there in the second paragraph of section
(chapter?) 1. It is interesting to note that the
3rd Circuit below upheld the striking down
of the statute in US v. Stevens because it did
not pass Strict Scrutiny—it found that the
interest in preventing cruelty to animals was
not compelling, that the statute was not
narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and
that it did not use the least restrictive means
of doing so. Although the Supreme Court
opinion struck the law down on the basis of
overbreadth, the only time that overbreadth
is mentioned in the 3rd Circuit opinion is in
a footnote in which it notes that the law only
“might” be overbroad. What I find most
fascinating is that, aside from a summary of
procedural history, there was no mention of
Strict Scrutiny in the entire majority
opinion. But all’s well that ends well, I
suppose.
The Court might choose to address Strict
Scrutiny in EMA v. Schwarzenegger and
maybe even overbreadth and vagueness. Not
to mention the variable obscenity issue that
would apply if the Court found that graphic
violence is an unprotected category of
speech. Time will tell.
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“Let’s Blast Video Violence”
The Globe and Mail
February 20, 2004
Douglas Gentile
Snipers. Rape. Cars targeting pedestrians.
Heads exploding in a shower of gore.

five admitted that he had bought an M-rated
game without parental knowledge.

These scenes can all be found in violent
video games, and this month the Journal of
Adolescence published several studies
looking at their effects on youth. I was
involved in one study (Gentile, Lynch,
Linder, & Walsh, 2004). After looking at
more than 600 Grade 8 and Grade 9
students, we found that playing a lot of
violent video games was a serious risk factor
linked with children’s anti-social and
aggressive
behaviour—even
after
controlling for the amount the children play,
their gender and whether they have naturally
hostile personalities. Surprisingly, even the
kids who are not naturally aggressive are
almost 10 times more likely, if they play a
lot of violent video games, to get into
physical fights than kids who do not.

As the research evidence about the negative
effects of violent games become more
compelling, parents, educators, and policymakers are increasingly concerned about
what to do. From my perspective, there are
three pillars of responsibility: the videogame industry, the rental and retail industry
and parents.

Our study is only one of about 40 peerreviewed, published studies that demonstrate
that playing violent video games increases
aggressive feelings and behaviours. These
games are not the Pac-Man and Pong of
earlier generations; as technology has
advanced, violent video games have become
extremely graphic (in Grand Theft Auto:
Vice City, a man encounters a prostitute, has
sex and then beats her to death to get his
money back).
Although such ultraviolent video games
carry an M (mature) rating, a recent study by
the American Federal Trade Commission
found that children can buy them easily. In a
separate study of nearly 800 Grade 4 to
Grade 8 kids, 87 per cent of boys reported
that they play M-rated games, and one in

The video-game industry must clearly and
accurately label the content of games, so that
parents know what they are getting before
buying. Recently, the authors of a study of
teen-rated games pointed out that there is a
“significant amount of content in T-rated
video games that might surprise adolescent
players and their parents” (including violent
sexual themes and drug use). The second
responsibility of the video-game industry is
to market its products appropriately. Yet
advertisements for M-rated games have
appeared in Sports Illustrated for Kids. It’s
unfair of the industry to label games as “not
for kids” while marketing them to children.
True, the industry has taken steps to reduce
this, but there is still significant room for
improvement.
The rental and retail industries also have
responsibilities. First, they must create
policies under which children under 17 may
not buy or rent M-rated games without
parental permission. Many stores, including
large chains and superstores, have no such
policies. Some of those who do don’t
enforce them. In one sting operation
conducted by the National Institute on
Media and the Family, children as young as
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seven encountered no problems in about half
of their attempts to buy M-rated games.
Parents should be able to expect that stores
won’t allow children access to M-rated
games—just as they expect movie theatres
won’t give children access to an R-rated
movie when parents drop them off at the
theatre.
The third pillar of responsibility is parents—
who must start by educating themselves
about the differences among video-game
ratings (“E” for everyone, “T” for teen, “M”
for mature) and to learn why it is important
to pay attention to the ratings. Here is where
the research is so useful: Studies show that
both amount and content matter. Children
who play a lot of video games get poorer
grades in school. Children who play violent
games appear to become more aggressive
over time.
Finally, parents need to act on their
knowledge. Just as playing violent games is
what scientists call a risk factor for negative
outcomes for children, active parental
involvement in children’s video-game habits
acts as a protective factor.
Should local, state, province or federal
governments get involved?
The video-game industry is responsive to
some parental concerns and to pressure from
politicians. Still, there probably are areas
where legislation could be helpful without
rising to the level of censorship. Just like the
1996 U.S. Telecommunications Act, which
mandated that TV shows be rated, new
legislation could require that the TV, movie,
and video-game industries create a universal
rating system so that parents need not learn
the full alphabet soup of different systems.
Legislation could also mandate that the
ratings be administered independently of
each medium (currently, U.S. TV ratings are

assigned by the TV networks, movie ratings
by the Motion Picture Association of
America, etc.) Legislation might also
mandate the creation of an independent
ratings-review board to do research on the
validity of the ratings and maintain
standards.
There have been legislative attempts to
restrict the sale of M-rated games to minors
in the United States. This approach seems
reasonable: The video-game industry itself
acknowledges that these games are not for
children (hence the M-rating), and legal
precedent in the United States has
established that the government has an
entirely appropriate role in limiting the
influences and activities to which children
are exposed.
In my country, state and local authorities
routinely restrict minors’ access to tobacco,
guns, pornography, and gambling. In fact,
the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ginsberg v. New
York (1968), upheld limiting minors’ access
to pornography on the basis of whether it
was “rational for the legislature to find that
the minors’ exposure to [such] material
might be harmful.”
The research conducted to date has clearly
met that test, and shows that, for some
children, exposure to violent media is
harmful. Oddly, the video-game industry has
fought every legislative attempt to restrict
the sale of M-rated games to minors. That is
puzzling; it suggests that the industry is
unwilling to stand behind its own ratings.
That fact alone makes it clear that parents
should be very cautious before they buy that
next “hot” game for their child.
Douglas A. Gentile is director of research at
the National Institute on Media and the
Family, and an assistant professor of
psychology at Iowa State University.
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“Effects of Violent Video Games”
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May 3, 2010
Jill U. Adams
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed last week to
hear a case on California’s attempt to restrict
sales of violent video games to minors. Both
the California lawmakers who approved the
law in 2005 and the U.S. 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals judges who overturned the law in
2009 claimed that scientific research was on
their side.
Lawmakers and judges aren’t the only ones
at odds over how to interpret research
studies. Scientists who study media violence
and its effects on children also are divided
on what their results mean.
“It’s a highly polarized research field,” says
Chris Ferguson, a psychology professor at
Texas A&M International University in
Laredo.
A number of studies have shown that
watching a lot of violence on television or
playing violent video games such as Grand
Theft Auto and Manhunt produces
aggressive tendencies in kids. Rowell
Huesmann, a professor of communications
and psychology at the University of
Michigan in Ann Arbor, says that the
strength of the evidence is on par with data
that say smoking cigarettes causes lung
cancer.
Other researchers pooh-pooh such assertions
and say that scientific findings have been
decidedly mixed—with several studies
finding no effects of violent video games on
children and teens who play them.
In addition, such critics say, when effects
are observed in studies, they have little or no
relevance to psychological states that trigger

violence in real-life situations.
“When scholars are making some of the
claims that they make”—such as how
consistent and strong the evidence is or that
the size of effects can be compared to the
link between smoking and lung cancer—
“they are being deeply dishonest with the
American public,” Ferguson says.
Given these polarized opinions, it’s not
surprising that parents, especially those
whose kids want to play the often violent
video games their friends are playing,
struggle to sort out what to do. Here’s a
closer look at whether playing violent video
games is putting America’s youth at risk.
American children spend plenty of time in
front of screens, be it playing video games
or watching television. One estimate says
kids are playing video games for 13 hours
each week, on average, and that more than
75% of teens who play report playing games
rated M (for mature) by the Entertainment
Software Rating Board, which often contain
intense violence, blood and gore.
Research has shown that immediately after
playing a violent video game, kids can have
aggressive thoughts, angry feelings and
physiological effects such as increased heart
rate and blood pressure. In addition, studies
that survey large populations of kids on their
game-playing habits and measure aggressive
personality traits or self-reported aggressive
acts—physical fights, arguments with
teachers—often find an association between
games and aggression.
And yet, even when a strong correlation is
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found, researchers cannot say that playing
violent video games causes such behavior. It
could be that kids with aggressive
tendencies gravitate toward playing the most
violent games.
The most compelling studies are ones that
track kids over a period of time. For
instance, a 2008 study published in the
journal Pediatrics followed 362 third-,
fourth- and fifth-graders in the U.S. and
1,231 youths ages 12 to 18 in Japan over a
single school year.
Early in the school year, kids were asked
about what games they played and for how
many hours. The more violent content they
were exposed to, the more likely subjects
were to report later in the year that they’d
been in physical fights.
“Is that every kid? No, it’s not every kid,”
says study co-author Douglas Gentile, a
psychology professor at Iowa State
University in Ames. But the trend was
statistically significant for both boys and
girls, he says, and other studies that have
lasted two years have found similar effects.
These so-called longitudinal studies start, at
least, to address the what-comes-first
problem, because they measure gameplaying first and assess aggressive behavior
later. Still, the approach doesn’t solve the
problem completely.
For instance, it can miss factors that
influence violent video game-playing and
aggressive behavior—absent or abusive
parents, perhaps.
It is also hard to assess the strength of any
video game aggression effect because
exposure to violent games varies so much.
Gentile says violent video games account for
about 4% of the differences among kids in
terms of aggressive behavior. Some

researchers think the number is higher—
Huesmann puts it at more like 10%. Neither
number seems very high, but then everyone
agrees that aggression is a complex human
behavior that is going to have multiple
causes.
“Usually when people are violent there’s a
whole set of converging factors,” Huesmann
says. “No reputable researcher that I know is
arguing that media violence or video-game
violence is the most important factor.” Other
known factors more strongly linked to child
aggression are a history of abuse, poverty,
genetics and personality—and the risk
climbs higher when several factors are
present in combination.
Still, Huesmann adds, “what’s really
irritating is when people say it isn’t a factor
at all—because the evidence is so
compelling.”
Ferguson, meanwhile, puts the strength of
the effect squarely at 0%. He says that
people are inventing a crisis where there is
none.
“As video games have become more violent
and more sophisticated and the sales of
video games have skyrocketed in the last
few
decades,
youth
violence
has
plummeted,” he says, citing evidence
compiled by various federal agencies.
Ferguson—who is not the only scientist
critical of violent-video-game research but
may be the most vocal—says some
researchers cherry-pick data, measuring a lot
of effects and analyzing only the ones that
show a difference between kids who play
violent video games and those who don’t.
Further, he says, some reviews of the
scientific literature exclude studies that
show no effect or, in a few cases, an
opposite effect (i.e., that consumers of
media violence showed less aggression). He
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While researchers and legal types continue
their row over violent video games, there are
things parents can do, Gentile says.

of Pediatrics recommends that kids’
exposure to screen time (meaning TV,
video, computer and video games) be
limited to one to two hours a day. And so,
Gentile adds, is “setting limits on content,
and talking to kids about what they’re seeing
and hearing.

Setting limits on the amounts of exposure is
important, he says—the American Academy

“Challenge it and make kids think it through
critically.”

published a detailed critique of these issues
in the March issue of the journal
Psychological Bulletin.
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